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Abstract
This study investigates the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR)
performance and cross-listing. In a clean setting where a change in CSR performance
can be attributed to the cross-listing, we find a statistically significant and
economically meaningful increase in CSR performance for the cross-listed firms.
Moreover, such an increase comes mostly in technical CSR, which targets the firms’
primary stakeholders. We also find that the positive association between cross-listing
and CSR improvements is more pronounced for firms with weak corporate
governance. The results hold under a variety of different robustness checks.
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility (CSR), Cross-listing, Bonding, Emerging
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Introduction
Being increasingly aware of the importance, firms in emerging markets are now
actively participate in corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices. A 2013 survey,1
carried out jointly by Duke University and CFO Magazine, shows that CFOs in emer-
ging markets are more concerned about CSR than are their counterparts in North
America. Good CSR performance is found to improve employee relations (Yu, 2008)
and customer satisfaction/loyalty (Deng, 2012; Lev, Petrovits, & Radhakrishnan, 2010;
Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006; Tian, Wang, & Yang, 2011), to increase firm competitive-
ness (Greening & Gray, 1994), productivity (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998) and product
quality (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Johnson & Greening, 1999), to lower the
cost of capital (Ye & Zhang, 2011) and firm risk (Bansal & Clelland, 2004; Godfrey,
Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; Muthuri & Gilbert, 2011; Wang, Qiu, & Kong, 2011), and to
build reputation (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Turban &
Greening, 1997; Verschoor, 1998; Waddock & Graves, 1997), all of which may, in turn,
increase firms’ profitability.
While the above studies investigate the consequences of CSR, this paper focuses on
its determinants. Specifically, we examine how the concept and practices of CSR have
diffused from developed markets to emerging markets. In this study, we cast light on a
channel through which firms from emerging markets improve their CSR practices via
cross-listing into a developed market. We extend the scope of bonding theory (Stulz,
1999; Coffee, 1999, 2002) to include CSR and argue that cross-listing subjects firms to
the monitoring of financial intermediaries, such as analysts, underwriters, and auditors,
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and to institutional and retail investors in developed markets, who arguably demand
better CSR performance and hence improve firms’ CSR practices. We empirically test
this hypothesis in a set of mainland firms cross-listed in Hong Kong.2 Employing a
novel dataset of CSR performance score for mainland listed firms, we find that
cross-listed firms perform better thanotherwise similar non-cross-listed firms in CSR
do. Moreover, the increase comes mostly in technical CSR, which targets the firms’ pri-
mary stakeholders. Such results are robust to a battery of robustness checks. Additional
tests show that the positive association between cross-listing and CSR improvements is
more pronounced for firms with weak corporate governance. We find no evidence sup-
porting the relation between CSR performance and firms’ future financial performance.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we contribute to the CSR diffusion literature by
suggesting and confirming a new channel of CSR diffusion from developed markets to
emerging markets. Our findings suggest that firms in an environment where the de-
mand for CSR is relatively low can voluntarily bond themselves with higher standards
of CSR practices by cross-listing into a developed market. Therefore, allowing firms
from less developed markets to cross-list is one effective way to propagate the CSR
concept into emerging markets. In a cross-country study, Boubakri, El Ghoul, Wang,
Guedhami, and Kwok (2016) document that cross-listed firms have better CSR per-
formance than non-cross-listed counterparts, where CSR performance refers to envir-
onmental and social performance. Our study supplements theirs by showing that
cross-listing improves other dimensions of CSR performance, especially technical CSR.
Second the current study also contributes to the literature on the role of
non-financial information in the capital market. According to a survey by ACCA,3 the
most important sources of non-financial information for investors are sustainability/
CSR reports. Our findings suggest that when non-financial performance (CSR perform-
ance) is more valued by foreign investors, firms tend to perform better in this aspect.
Finally, our study also has important policy implications. Our results show that CSR
performance is not associated with higher valuation or improvements in the financial
performance of the firm. Firms seeking cross-listing may face demands from host mar-
ket investors to improve their CSR performance that are not fully appreciated by their
home market investors. As such, firms seeking cross-listing need to trade off between
the demands from their host and home markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section “Literature review and
hypotheses development” reviews the relevant literature and develops our hypotheses.
Section “Measurement, methodology, and sample descriptions” describes the data and
methods used to test the hypotheses. Section “Empirical results” presents and interprets
the results, and Section “Conclusions and limitations” concludes.
Literature review and hypotheses development
Determinants of CSR
There are various definitions of CSR. Davis (1973), for example, defines CSR as “the
firms’ considerations of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, tech-
nical, and legal requirements for the firm to accomplish social and environmental bene-
fits along with the traditional economic gains which the firms seek.” CSR can also be
described as integrating four components, including economic, legal, ethical, and
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discretionary or philanthropic components (A.B. Carroll, 1979, 1991), and can be de-
fined as the manner in which businesses engage their stakeholders, including share-
holders, employees, customers, suppliers, governments, international organizations,
and the natural environment through policies, processes, and procedures (Snider, Hill,
& Martin, 2003; Waddock, Bodwell, & Graves, 2002). Regardless of the definition,
typical CSR activities include providing products that have social and environmental
features, adopting production methods that reduce negative environmental impacts,
caring for employees, nurturing supplier relationships, investing in local communities,
and pursuing philanthropic initiatives. As such, CSR activities enhance firms’ relation-
ships with various stakeholders, and without their participation the firms cannot
survive (Clarkson, 1995).
Some studies examine the effect of CSR disclosure on financial performance. For ex-
ample, Chen, Hung, and Wang (2018) find that mainland firms experience a decrease
in profitability after the mandatory disclosure of CSR. However, our paper differs from
theirs in that we are interested in CSR performance rather than CSR disclosure. Some
other studies examine the effects of firms’ CSR performance on their financial perform-
ance (Archie B. Carroll and Shabana (2010). However, relatively little research has
attempted to explain the variation of CSR performance among different firms (Margolis
& Walsh, 2003). Campbell (2007) provides an institutional theory of CSR and argues
that the determinants of CSR include the general financial condition of the firm, the
health of the economy, the intensity of competition faced by the firm, institutional fac-
tors(including public and private regulations) the presence of non-governmental and
other independent organizations, institutionalized norms, associative behavior among
corporations, and organized dialogue between corporations and their stakeholders.
Archival and experimental studies confirm the role of external factors such as media
(including social media) (Grafstrom & Windell, 2011; Lee, Van Dolen, & Kolk, 2013;
Lyon & Montgomery, 2013), law (Jackson & Apostolakou, 2010; Shum & Yam, 2011),
and politics (Zhao, 2012) as well as the roles of internal factors, such as ownership
structure (Oh, Chang, & Martynov, 2011), and manager and owner characteristics, such
as attitude (Roxas & Coetzer, 2012) or style (Du, Swaen, Lindgreen, & Sen, 2013). Pe-
dersen and Gwozdz (2014) argue that the inconsistency within (rather than between)
stakeholders groups creates pressure for CSR.
Most of the previous studies focus on the firms in developed markets. While studies
on CSR in emerging markets are still sparse, such studies are becoming the driving
force of CSR research (Bruton & Lau, 2008; Moon & Shen, 2010). However, very little
effort has been devoted to explaining the convergence of CSR practices in emerging
markets towards those in developed markets. Jamali and Neville (2011), for example,
find convergence in explicit CSR among Lebanese firms. Bardy, Drew, and Kennedy
(2012) argue that foreign direct investment (FDI) and international business ventures
promote positive social and economic development in emerging nations.
Cross-listing, bonding, and CSR
Cross-listing allows firms to access to more developed capital markets and achieve bet-
ter valuation (Lins, Strickland, & Zenner, 2005). Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), for
example, find that foreign firms with shares cross-listed in U.S. equity markets are
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better valued than are their non-cross-listed peer firms from the same country. Chinese
mainland firms cross-listed in Chinese Hong Kong are found to enjoy a similar premium
(Sun, Tong, & Wu, 2013a; Sun, Tong, & Zhang, 2013). One reason for the firms’ increased
valuation is risk sharing: Cross-listing allows domestic investors to share the risk with for-
eign investors, and these investors, in turn, demand a lower risk premium (Foerster &
Karolyi, 1999). Another reason for this is improved information disclosure and share-
holder protection (Coffee, 1999, 2002; Doidge et al., 2004; Reese & Weisbach, 2002).
A key mechanism through which cross-listed firms improve shareholder protection is
the bonding effect (also known as functional convergence). Cross-listing subjects the
firms to the provisions of securities law and the accounting standards of the host coun-
try. Therefore, to the extent that the host country’s legal system and accounting stan-
dards are more stringent than those of the home country, the legal bonding hypothesis
of Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999) contends that cross-listing increases the expected
costs of extracting private benefits for managers and, therefore, that cross-listed firms
protect minority shareholders’ interests better. On the other hand, Siegel (2005) finds that
very few Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement actions have been
taken against foreign firms listed in US, which casts doubt on the legal bonding effects.
While cross-listing is typically found to be positively associated with corporate
governance, the legal bonding hypothesis does not naturally extend to corporate
social responsibility for at least two reasons. First, cross-listed firms generally carry
out their business in their home countries (this is particularly true for our sample
firms; see the details in the next section). Cross-listing does not subject them to
the environmental regulations or labor laws in the host market. For example, it is
unlikely for Baidu.com, a Chinese Internet content provider listed in NASDAQ
(ticker: BIDU), to apply American labor laws to its employees in Beijing. Second,
CSR calls for firms to go beyond the minimum requirements of law. Despite the
various conceptualizations of CSR in the literature, CSR in general refers to firm
actions that meet demands from stakeholders other than shareholders and credi-
tors. This means that CSR activities are likely to be beyond the minimum require-
ment of law. Therefore, cross-listed firms may not improve their CSR practices
through legal bonding.
However, there is another mechanism of bonding suggested by both Stulz (1999)
and Coffee (1999, 2002), referred to as reputational bonding. They argue that
bonding can also be achieved via the monitoring of other intermediaries, including
analysts, underwriters, auditors, and institutional investors. Coffee (2002) argues
that these intermediaries serve as financial watchdogs that supplement the moni-
toring already provided by public regulators such as the SEC. This mechanism of
bonding is particularly relevant to CSR practices. Shareholders and the business
press are now increasingly active in pushing firms toward social responsibility. In
the spring of 2008, for example, dissident shareholders, including several descen-
dants of John D. Rockefeller and a number of asset management firms and pension
funds of the Exxon Mobil Corp., urged the firm to take action on climate change.
Thus, if firms from emerging markets elect to cross-list in more developed mar-
kets, they face more demands on CSR performance from the shareholders and
other financial intermediates in the host markets, compared to their
non-cross-listed peers.
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Mainland firms cross-listed in Hong Kong
There are two ways through which a mainland firm can cross list in the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange. The first is through back-door listing, in which a Hong Kong listed firm
is taken over by a holding firm outside mainland (usually incorporated in Hong Kong) but
is controlled by the central government or provincial/municipal government in mainland.
These mainland-controlled and Hong Kong-incorporated firms are known as “red-chips”.
The second way is through direct listing, where a mainland-incorporated firm directly
lists its shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. These stocks are known as “H shares”.
The first H share was issued in July 1993, when Tsingtao Brewery was welcomed by a 111
times oversubscription. Many H share firms float their shares simultaneously in Hong
Kong and one of the two mainland stock exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen) as A shares.
With few exceptions, these firms are listed first in Hong Kong and then in mainland
exchanges, in contrast to the general practices of cross-listing elsewhere.
Cross-listing subjects red-chips and H share firms to the monitoring of Hong Kong
intermediaries and investors. While they may not be as demanding as their counter-
parts in US, the Hong Kong financial intermediaries and investors are more likely to
demand more in terms of CSR than their mainland counterparts. In fact, prior studies
find that CSR is still at a very early stage in Chinese mainland (Gugler & Shi, 2009; Ip,
2009) and that mainland managers and investors care more about financial perform-
ance than CSR performance (Cooke & He, 2010; Zu & Song, 2009). From the perspec-
tive of the supply side, the reputational bonding urges the managers of cross-listed
firms to provide more CSR activities than non-cross-listed firms do. Taken together,
the (reputational) bonding theory predicts that firms cross-listed in Hong Kong have
better CSR performance than their non-cross-listed peers in Chinese mainland. We
thus hypothesize the following:
H1: Cross-listed firms perform better in CSR than non-cross-listed firms do.
The prior CSR literature has differentiated between technical and institutional CSR
based on the targeting stakeholder of CSR practices (Godfrey et al., 2009). Technical
CSR refers to a firm’s CSR actions that target their primary stakeholders, i.e., those who
are essential to the operation of the business. Primary stakeholders include customers,
employees, and investors. Technical CSR activities include those products-related,
employees-related, and corporate-governance-related activities. Institutional CSR in-
stead covers a firm’s CSR activities that target their secondary stakeholders in the com-
munity and environment domains. We expect cross-listed firms to improve more in
technical CSR than in institutional CSR for two reasons. First, reputational bonding
works through the monitoring investors and financial intermediates, who either are pri-
mary stakeholders themselves (investors) or serve the primary stakeholders (intermedi-
ates). To the extent that primary stakeholders tend to have more power in making
legitimate and urgent claims on the firm (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), cross-listed
firms are more likely to react to meet the demands from these stakeholders. In con-
trast, institutional CSR activities are more likely to result from discretionary
decision-making by the firm. Second, unlike institutional CSR activities, technical CSR
activities are often consistent with the firm’s profit-making interests and are therefore
in the interest of the investors and financial intermediates. To summarize, we
hypothesize the following:
H2a: Cross-listed firms perform better in technical CSR than non-cross-listed firms do.
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H2b: Cross-listed firms do not perform better in institutional CSR than non-cross-listed
firms do.
Measurement, methodology, and sample descriptions
Measurement of CSR performance
Our measure of CSR performance is obtained from Hexun,4 one of the leading Internet
content providers of financial information in Chinese mainland. Hexun.com, founded
in 1996, constructs a system of CSR scores for all the firms listed in the Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Unlike the KLD Research and Analytics system in U.S.,
Hexun quantifies the CSR performance of firms with only five dimensions: the investor,
the employee, the customer and supplier, the environment, and the community dimen-
sion.5 Hexun quantifies each of the five dimensions with multiple sub-dimensions. For
example, to measure firms’ performance from the employee perspective, Hexun quanti-
fies firms’ performance with regard to salary and training, working environment safety,
and welfare. Hexun assigns different weights to the five dimensions for firms in differ-
ent industries to reach an aggregate CSR score. Instead of directly using the Hexun
CSR measure, we follow Kim, Park, and Wier (2012) and construct our own measure
that excludes the investor’s dimension. For each year from 2010 to 2012, we first rank
the mainland listed firms into deciles based on the Hexun score within each industry
for each of the four dimensions. For each firm in each year, we then take the average of
the four ranks to obtain our measure of CSR performance, the CSR score. We also con-
struct a measure of the technical CSR score as the average of a firm’s employee and
customer dimensions of CSR performance. The institutional CSR score is similarly con-
structed using the firm’s environment and community dimensions.
Measure of cross-listing and control variables
Although there are two different types of cross-listed stocks (red-chips and H shares),
we exclude red-chips from our sample. Red-chips are incorporated outside Chinese
mainland, and their fundamentals may not be directly comparable to A shares. Hence,
our empirical design compares the CSR performance of dual-listed AH share firms with
that of the pure A-share firms. We obtain the list of AH shares from the China Stock
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.
Theoretical (e.g., Campbell, 2007) and empirical works show that determinants of
CSR include the general financial condition of the firm and the health of the economy.
We thus include in our regression model a battery of firm-level control variables, such
as firm size, leverage, market to book ratio (MTB), and return on assets (ROA), to ac-
count for the firm financial conditions. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets, Le-
verage is defined as total debt divided by total assets, MTB is the ratio between market
value and book value of common stocks, and ROA is the return on assets, all of which
are calculated based on accounting data obtained from CSMAR. We also control for
industry-level competition and industry and time fixed effects.
Empirical design
To establish a causal relation between cross-listing and their CSR performance, the
ideal design is to compare firms’ CSR performance before and after cross-listing.
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Although it is powerful, this empirical design is not feasible in our context. Most of the
cross-listed firms were first listed in Hong Kong as early as the 1990s, providing us
with few observations for a before-and-after comparison because our CSR score data
are only available for the period of 2010 to 2012. Instead, we must compare the CSR
performance of cross-listed shares with that of non-cross-listed A shares. We estimate
the following model to test our main hypothesis:
CSRscoreit ¼ αþ β cross−listingi þ γ  controlsit þ εit ð1Þ
In Eq. (1), i denotes the firm, and t denotes the year. CSR score is the average CSR
performance, which we obtain as described in the previous subsection, and Cross-listing
is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i is cross-listed in Hong Kong. Hypothesis
H1 predicts a positive and significant value for β. Our dependent variable, CSR score, is
censored between 1 and 10 by design. We therefore use the censored regression model
of Tobin (1958) to estimate the model.
To test our hypotheses H2a and H2b, we replace the dependent variable with the
technical and institutional CSR scores and estimate Eq. (1) separately for each of the
two CSR constructs.
Sample construction and description
We may encounter a potential problem of sample selection bias when estimating
Eq. (1). Instead of directly comparing cross-listed firms’ CSR performance before
and after cross-listing, we are essentially assuming that AH shares are randomly
drawn from the population of non-cross-listed A share firms. However, this as-
sumption is not guaranteed. We follow Ke, Rui, and Yu (2012) to filter the A share
sample to consist of state-owned firms and firms with size greater than the 85% of
pure A share firms. We also require that all the sample firms are covered by the
Hexun CSR database. After filtering the sample, we have 626 observations in the
three years from 2010 to 2012, of which approximately one third are cross-listed
in Hong Kong. The summary statistics and correlation matrix of our variables are
presented in Table 1.
The average CSR score of our sample is 7.31. By construction, the mean of CSR score
for all mainland listed firms should be 5.5. Hence, our sample firms make better efforts
on CSR than the excluded firms. As a result of our filtering process, our sample firms
are large in size and have average total assets worth 39 billion yuan. They are also
highly levered, with an average leverage ratio of 0.64. The averageMTB and ROA are
1.78 and 0.04, respectively. Overall, our sample firms are large, highly levered and with
relatively low market valuation and profitability.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the correlation matrix of our variables. The Cross--
listing dummy is positively correlated with CSR score, with a correlation of 0.18,
and is significant at the conventional level, providing preliminary support for the
bonding hypothesis. The highest pairwise correlation between our variables is −
0.52 (between Leverage and ROA). Hence, our analysis is less concerned about po-
tential multicollinearity issues.
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Empirical results
Main tests
Table 2 reports the empirical results of H1 with our filtered sample. Column 1 reports
the results of our baseline regression, where we include only Cross-listing. The coeffi-
cient on Cross-listing is positive and statistically significant (0.76 with a t-value of 3.38).
That is, holding all other things constant, the cross-listed firms’ CSR score is 0.76
higher than that of non-cross-listed firms. Because the CSR score takes values from 1
Table 1 Summary statistics and correlation matrix
Mean Std Min P25 Median P75 Max
Panel A
[1] CSR score 7.31 1.98 2.50 5.50 8.00 9.00 10.00
[2] Cross-listing 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
[3] Size (raw value) 0.39 1.58 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.09 11.83
[4] Leverage 0.64 1.78 0.17 0.51 0.66 0.77 0.95
[5] MTB 1.78 1.66 0.05 0.99 1.36 2.09 19.00
[6] ROA 0.04 0.45 −0.13 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.19
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Panel B:
[1] CSR score 1.00
[2] Cross-listing 0.18
[3] Size (raw value) −0.03 0.25
[4] Leverage −0.06 − 0.08 0.33
[5] MTB −0.06 −0.05 − 0.12 0.01
[6] ROA 0.08 0.03 −0.12 −0.52 0.26
This table presents the summary statistics and the correlation matrix of CSR score, Cross-listing, Size, Leverage, MTB,
and ROA
Table 2 Cross-listing and CSR
(1) (2) (3)
Cross-listing 0.76c 0.69c 0.75c
(3.38) (2.66) (2.99)
Size 0.02 0.58c
(0.23) (3.95)
Leverage −0.12 −1.24
(−0.12) (−1.17)
MTB −0.08 0.05
(−0.72) (0.49)
ROA 4.46 −0.21
(1.24) (−0.06)
Constant 7.07c 6.55c −8.09b
(45.05) (2.96) (−2.39)
Industry and Year fixed effects NO NO YES
Observations 626 626 626
Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.10
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics adjusted for firm level clustering are reported in parentheses. a, b, and c
represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively
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to 10, this difference is also economically significant. In columns 2 and 3, we include
the full set of controls as well as industry and year fixed effects in the regression.
Consistent with the previous literature, large firms have more resources to allocate to
CSR and thus perform better in CSR. More importantly, the coefficient on Cross-listing
remains significantly positive in all columns.
We then differentiate the effects of cross-listing on technical and institutional CSR
performance and test our hypotheses 2 (a and b). We construct a measure of technical
CSR score as the average of a firm’s employee and customer dimension of CSR per-
formance. The institutional CSR score is similarly constructed with the firm’s environ-
ment and community dimensions of CSR performance. The Tobit regression estimates
are then reported in Table 3. The coefficient on Cross-listing is 1.10 and is statistically
significant for the technical CSR score. In contrast, the coefficient on the institutional
CSR score is only 0.42 and is not significantly different from zero. A Chow test of the
difference between the two coefficients strongly rejects the hypothesis that the two are
equivalent. Hence, our empirical results show that cross-listing improves firms’ tech-
nical CSR more than their institutional CSR, which is consistent with our hypothesis 2.
Additional test
Cross-listing and CSR: impact of corporate governance
Our results so far show that cross-listed firms exhibit better CSR performance than
their non-cross-listed counterparts do. However, we do not assume that all the
cross-listed firms subject themselves to the same degree of reputational bonding. Firms
with weaker corporate governance are arguably more likely to be under the scrutiny of
investors and financial intermediates. Hence, firms with weaker corporate governance
may exhibit more improvement in CSR performance after cross-listing. We partition
our sample into two subsamples based on their corporate governance metrics and
Table 3 Technical vs. Institutional CSR
Technical CSR score Institutional CSR score
Cross-listing 1.10c 0.42
(3.86) (1.47)
Size 0.60c 0.52c
(3.84) (3.73)
Leverage −2.27a −0.03
(−1.88) (−0.03)
MTB 0.09 0.00
(0.97) (0.03)
ROA −3.67 3.27
(−0.93) (0.88)
Constant −9.46c −7.80b
(−2.59) (−2.46)
Industry and Year fixed effects YES YES
Observations 626 626
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.07
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics adjusted for firm level clustering are reported in parentheses. a, b, and c
represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively
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re-estimate eq. (1) separately for each subsample. We measure corporate governance
with two proxies: West and Earnings management. The first is an exogenous measure.
Arguably, firms in more developed provinces in Chinese mainland exhibit better cor-
porate governance. The Tobit regression results for these two groups are reported in
the first row of Table 4. We only report the coefficients on Cross-listing. The coefficient
is positive at 0.46 but is not significantly different from zero for the firms from more
developed provinces. In sharp contrast, the coefficient is significantly positive (1.45 with
a t-value of 3.61) for firms from less developed provinces.
The second measure that we employ is the degree of earnings management. We obtain the
discretional accrual from the modified Jones model and use its absolute value as our measure-
ment of Earnings Management.6 Our sample firms are then partitioned into two groups based
on the median level of absolute discretional accrual level. The Tobit regression results for these
two groups are reported in the second row of Table 5. The coefficient is positive at 0.49 but is
not significantly different from zero for firms with a lower level of earnings management, while
the coefficient is significantly positive for firms with a higher level of earnings management.
Taken together, our results suggest that the positive impact of cross-listing on CSR perform-
ance is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance.
The link between improved CSR and financial performance
In this subsection, we test whether an improved CSR for cross-listed firms is associated
with higher equity market valuation or better financial performance. Stakeholder theory
argues that CSR practices can improve financial performance since the success of a
firm depends on the extent to which it satisfies the various stakeholders’ needs (Clacher
& Hagendorff, 2012; Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Alternatively, a socially responsible
management may possess the requisite skills to run a superior firm (Moskowitz, 1972)
or ethically provide high accounting quality (Chih et al., 2008), which may cause inves-
tors to value the firms with better CSR performance more.
We regress the financial performance measures (Tobin’s Q and ROA) on lagged
CSR score and a set of control variables (Size, Leverage, industry and year fixed ef-
fects). We do not find a significant association between firm CSR score and future
financial performance, which is inconsistent with the stakeholder theory. Our re-
sults, however, cannot be generalized because our sample firms are dominated by
large state-controlled firms. A related study by Chen, Hung and Wang (2018) finds
that mainland firms experience a decrease in profitability after the mandatory
Table 4 Cross-listing and CSR: Impact of corporate governance
Cross-listing
Strong corporate governance Weak corporate governance
West 0.46 1.45c
(1.48) (3.61)
Earning management 0.49 0.81c
(1.46) (2.77)
The sample is partitioned on corporate governance, where corporate governance is measured by West and Earnings
management. Firms domiciled in western provinces (West) and firms with a high level of earnings management (Earnings
Management) are defined as weak corporate governance subsamples. Only the coefficients on cross-listing are reported.
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics adjusted for firm level clustering are reported in parentheses. a, b, and c
represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively
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disclosure of CSR. However, we are interested in whether CSR performance is as-
sociated with financial performance.
Robustness checks
Our results reported in the previous sections may suffer from two sources of bias. First,
our sample filtering process may not completely solve the sample selection bias, and
the choice of 85% is rather arbitrary. We hence try to filter the sample at the 25th per-
centile and the median and without filtering. The results are reported in Panel A of
Table 6. Moreover, Sun, Tong, and Wu find that firms elect to cross-list in Hong Kong
since H shares differ significantly in size, leverage, growth, and industry from the
non-cross-listed firms in Chinese mainland. We attempt to address this sample selec-
tion bias issue by employing the propensity score matching methodology (Rosenbaum
& Rubin, 1983; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). In particular, we first estimate the follow-
ing logistic model:
LogitðCross−listingi ¼ αþ γ  controlsit þ εit ð2Þ
Table 5 CSR and financial performance
Tobin’s Qt + 1 ROAt + 1
CSR score −0.00 −0.00
(−0.01) (−0.30)
Size −0.37a 0.00c
(−1.76) (2.67)
Leverage 3.23a −0.01
(1.81) (−0.60)
Constant 13.29c 0.87c
(3.90) (15.64)
Industry and Year fixed effects YES YES
Observations 391 392
R-squared 0.10 0.22
This table presents the regression estimations of the following model:
Financial performanceitþ1 ¼ αþ β CSR scoreit þ γ  controlsit þ εit
Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics adjusted for firm level clustering are reported in parentheses. a, b, and c
represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively
Table 6 Robustness checks
Panel A: Different filtering
Full sample Top 3 quartiles Above median
Cross-listing 0.73c 0.62b 0.52 a
(3.12) (2.36) (1.95)
Panel B: Different specifications
PSM Including Lagged Dependent
Cross-listing 0.52b 0.17a
(2.05) (1.97)
This table presents the Tobit regression estimations of the following model:
CSR scoreit ¼ αþ β  cross−listingi þ γ  controlsit þ εit
Panel A presents the results with different filtering of sample firms and Panel B presents the results with different model
specifications. Only the coefficients on Cross-listing are reported. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics adjusted for firm
level clustering are reported in parentheses. a, b, and c represent statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively
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In Eq. (2), we follow Sun et al. (2013) by including Size, Leverage, MTB, ROA, State
and industry fixed effects, and State is defined as a dummy variable that takes the value
of one if the ultimate controller of the firm is state-related and zero otherwise. Estima-
tions of Eq. (2) are not tabulated for parsimonious reasons. Consistent with Sun et al.
(2013), cross-listed firms are larger in size, hold less debt, and are more likely to be
controlled by the state. Surprisingly, the cross-listed firms are less profitable, consistent
with Hung et al. (2008). Industry fixed effects are mostly significant, thus confirming
the important role of industry in firms’ decisions to be cross-listed in Hong Kong. The
coefficient on Cross-listing based on the propensity score matched sample is reported
in the first column of Panel B of Table 6. As shown, the results are consistent with our
main findings.
While we have accounted for the selection bias, one may argue that we have omitted
an important factor that determines firm’s CSR performance. Our estimation for the
coefficient on Cross-listing is still valid if the omitted variable is not correlated with the
cross-listing dummy. If, however, the omitted variable is correlated with Cross-listing, it
causes an endogeneity issue, and our estimates reported in Table 3 will be biased. We
resolve this bias by using lagged CSR score as the dependent variable (Wooldridge,
2002). The results are reported in the second column of Panel B of Table 6. Again, the
coefficient on Cross-listing remains positive and significant.7
Conclusions and limitations
We study the association between CSR performance and cross-listing in this paper. In
a clean setting where the change in CSR performance can be attributed to the choice of
cross-listing, we find a statistically significant and economically meaningful increase in
CSR performance for the cross-listed firms compared with the non-cross-listed firms.
Moreover, the increase can mostly be attributed to technical CSR, which targets the
firms’ primary stakeholders. We also find the positive association between cross-listing
and CSR improvements to be more pronounced for firms from less developed prov-
inces and firms with a higher degree of earnings management. These results are robust
to a series of different robustness checks.
Our conclusions need to be generalized with cautions though. First, our study only
covers a small sample of 265 unique firms from 2010 to 2012. All the cross-listed firms
are from one country only. Future research can extend our study to a multinational set-
ting. Second, despite our efforts in addressing the endogeneity problem, the causal rela-
tion between cross-listing and CSR performance should be interpreted with caution.
Endnotes
1https://www.cfosurvey.org/13q3/PressRelease.pdf
2Starting from December 2008, the two stock exchanges in China (the Shanghai
Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange) required certain types of
listed firms to issue stand-alone CSR report. The mandatory requirement covers
the following types of firms: (i) firms included in the “Corporate Governance
Index”; (ii) cross-listed firms; (iii) financial firms; and (iv) firms included in the
“Shenzhen 100 Index”.
3Available at: http://www.accaglobal.com/content/dam/acca/global/PDF-technical/
sustainability-reporting/tech-tp-wdir.pdf
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4www.hexun.com.
5Compared with the KLD, the missing dimensions are diversity and corporate
governance.
6See Dechow (1994) and Kim et al. (2012) for more details.
7By including the lagged dependent variable, the coefficient on CSR score is down-
ward biased. However, this bias suggests that our estimation is conservative.
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